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ABSTRACT
When toxic online communities on mainstream platforms face moderation
measures, such as bans, they may migrate to other platforms with laxer
policies or set up their own dedicated website. Previous work suggests
that, withinmainstream platforms, community-level moderation is effective
in mitigating the harm caused by the moderated communities. It is, how-
ever, unclear whether these results also hold when considering the broader
Web ecosystem. Do toxic communities continue to grow in terms of user
base and activity on their new platforms? Do their members become more
toxic and ideologically radicalized? In this paper, we report the results of
a large-scale observational study of how problematic online communities
progress following community-level moderation measures. We analyze data
from r/The_Donald and r/Incels, two communities that were banned
from Reddit and subsequently migrated to their own standalone websites.
Our results suggest that, in both cases, moderation measures significantly
decreased posting activity on the new platform, reducing the number of
posts, active users, and newcomers. In spite of that, users in one of the stud-
ied communities (r/The_Donald) showed increases in signals associated
with toxicity and radicalization, which justifies concerns that the reduction
in activity may come at the expense of a more toxic and radical commu-
nity. Overall, our results paint a nuanced portrait of the consequences of
community-level moderation and can inform their design and deployment.
1 INTRODUCTION
The term “content moderation” is commonly associated with the
process of screening the appropriateness of user-generated con-
tent, as well as imposing penalties on users who break the plat-
form rules [39]. However, social networking platforms sometimes
host entire communities that systematically skirt or break the rules.
There, host platforms oftentimes ban or limit the functionalities of
one or several online communities. This has happened, for exam-
ple, when Facebook decided to ban groups related to the “QAnon”
conspiracy [45], or when Reddit decided that not all communities
were welcome on the platform [13] and banned subreddits like
r/FatPeopleHate and r/transfags.
The extent to which platforms should be the judges, juries, and
executioners of these interventions is a topic of heated debate
and has prompted experiments of governance models with soci-
etal participation [10]. There, platforms outsource some of their
policy decisions—e.g., should we ban an online movement from
our platform?—to a panel of experts (e.g., journalists, politicians,
lawyers) representing the public interest [4].
Nonetheless, we are still left with answering a preceding ques-
tion: is community-level moderation effective to begin with? We
argue why this is not obvious, visually, in Fig. 1, depicting possi-










Figure 1: Motivation: As a result of community-level ban,
users from affected communities may choose to (a) partic-
ipate in other communities on the same platform or (b) mi-
grate to an alternative, possibly fringe platform where their
behavior is considered acceptable. Scenario a, on which
most prior work has focused, is more amenable to data-
driven analysis. The present paper, on the contrary, focuses
on the harder-to-analyze scenario b.
a recently banned toxic
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community may take. The users may
(a) continue to be active on the same platform and participate in
other groups and communities there, or (b) abandon the platform
altogether and migrate to a different platform. In both scenarios,
community-level moderation could have unintended consequences.
In scenario a, the moderation measure could set loose an army of
trolls across the platform, creating issues in other communities
or new problematic communities [8]. In scenario b, the ban could
unintentionally strengthen an alternative platform (e.g., 4chan or
Gab) where problematic content goes largely unmoderated [29].
From the new platform, the harms inflicted by the toxic community
on society could be even higher.
Previous work has addressed the “within platform” concern.
Chandrasekharan et al. [8] and Saleem and Ruths [41] studied
what happened following Reddit’s 2015 bans, finding that users
who remained in the platform drastically decreased their usage
of hate speech and that counter-actions taken by users from the
banned subreddits were promptly neutralized. More broadly, Ra-
jadesingan et al. [35] showed that, when “toxic users” migrate to
healthy communities, they reduce their toxicity levels.
Nevertheless, the concern that migrations to an alternative plat-
form would strengthen the toxic communities or make them more
1
We use ‘toxic’ as an umbrella term to refer to socially undesirable content: sexist,
racist, homophobic, or transphobic posts and targeted harassment as well as conspiracy























ideologically radical is still largely unexplored. Existing work sug-
gests that, in the wake of community-level moderation, users ac-
tively seek out, and migrate to, alternative websites where their
speech will not be censored [31, 43]. However, partly due to the
data collection challenges posed by cross-platform studies, work on
the consequences of community-level moderation across platforms
has remained at the simulation level [22].
Present work. This paper presents an observational study of the
efficacy of community-level moderation across platforms. We ex-
amine two popular communities that were originally created and
grew on Reddit, r/The_Donald and r/Incels. Facedwith sanctions
from the platform, they created their own standalone websites—
thedonald.win and incels.co—and encouraged their Reddit user
bases to mass migrate to the new sites. To assess whether com-
munity-level moderation measures were effective in reducing the
negative impact of these communities (which we refer to as TD and
Incel, respectively), we study how they progressed following their
platform migrations. More specifically, we ask:
RQ1 Have the communities retained their activity levels and their
capacity to attract new members following the migration?
RQ2 Have the communities become more toxic or ideologically
radical following the migration?
Both dimensions are crucial to assess whether community-level
moderation measures were truly effective. If the communities sim-
ply “changed addresses” and grew larger and more toxic on the new
platforms, the moderation measures may have actually increased
their capacity to harm society as well as their own members; e.g.,
outside of Reddit, these communities might orchestrate online ha-
rassment campaigns more effectively or disseminate more hate
speech.
Materials and methods. To study how migrations affect com-
munities, we leverage around 7 million posts made by more than
100 thousand users pooled across the platforms before (Reddit)
and after (standalone websites) the migration event. We extract
activity-related signals, such as the number of posts, active users,
and newcomers, as well as content-related signals, such as algo-
rithmically derived “toxicity scores,” that aim to identify behaviors
indicative of user radicalization, such as fixation and group iden-
tification [11]. Employing quasi-experimental setups, including
matching and regression discontinuity designs, we study these
signals from a community-level perspective, analyzing how daily ac-
tivity and overall content changed, and from a user-level perspective,
examining how the behavior of individual users changed following
platform migrations.
Summary of findings. Analyzing activity levels and the inflow of
newcomers to the communities (RQ1), we find that the moderation
measures significantly reduced the overall number of active users,
newcomers, and posts in the new communities compared to the
original ones. However, individually, users posted more often on the
alternative platforms. A closer look at the users whom we managed
to match before vs. after the migration suggests that this increase
in relative activity is due to self-selection: users who migrated were
more active to begin with.
Analyzing changes in the content being posted in the communi-
ties following the migration (RQ2), we find evidence that users in
the TD community became more toxic, negative and hostile when
talking about “objects of fixation” (e.g., democrats for TD, women
for Incels). Changes in the usage of third-person plural (e.g., “they”)
and first-person plural (e.g., “we”) pronouns also indicate an in-
crease in group-identification and othering language. For the Incel
community, we find that changes tend to be statistically insignifi-
cant, and that the migration was often associated with a decrease
in signals related to ideological radicalization.
Implications. Our analysis suggests that community-level moder-
ation measures decrease the capacity of toxic communities to retain
their activity levels and attract new members, but that this may
come at the expense of making these communities more toxic and
ideologically radical. Therefore, as platforms moderate, they should
consider their impact not only on their own websites and services
but in the context of theWeb as a whole. Toxic communities respect
no platform boundary, and thus, cooperation among platforms and
with the research community may help in better assessing the effi-
cacy of moderation policies. Overall, we expect that our nuanced
analysis will aid stakeholders to take moderation decisions and
make moderation policies in an evidence-based fashion.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review background concepts as well as relevant
previous work.
2.1 Community-level Moderation on Reddit
Reddit employs two community-wide moderation measures: quar-
antining and banning. When a community is quarantined, it stops
appearing in Reddit’s search results and front page. Moreover, users
who attempt to access quarantined subreddits (directly through
their URLs) are met with a splash page warning them of the shock-
ing or offensive content contained inside. In contrast, banning a
community makes it inaccessible and removes all its prior posts.
Quarantining frequently precedes banning, so in practice, it serves
as a warning to the subreddit to reform itself.
The history of community-level moderation in Reddit dates back
to 2015, when Reddit banned five subreddits for infringing their
anti-harassment policy [40]. Newell et al. [31] studied how these
bans led users to migrate towards alternative platforms (e.g., Voat).
Using a mix of self-reported statements and large-scale data anal-
ysis, they identified reasons why users left Reddit and found that
alternative platforms struggled to attain the same diversity of com-
munities as Reddit. The effects of these bans within Reddit were
also extensively studied [8, 41], as previously discussed. Overall,
findings from these studies suggest that the bans worked for Reddit:
they led to sustained reduced interaction of users with the Reddit
platform; users who stayed became less toxic after they migrated
to other communities within Reddit; and counter-actions taken by
users (e.g., creating alternative subreddits) were not effective.
2.2 Communities of Interest
TD. The r/The_Donald subreddit (TD) was created on 27 June 2015
to support the then-presidential candidate Donald Trump in his
bid for the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. The discussion board,
linked with the rise of the Alt-right movement at large, has been
denounced as racist, sexist, and islamophobic [27]. Its members
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Figure 2: Timelines: We depict the dates of creation, quaran-
tining, and banning for the two communities studied here.
often engaged in “political trolling,” harassing Trump’s opponents,
promoting satirical hashtags, and creating memes with pro-Trump
and anti-Clinton propaganda [14]. TD is also known for spreading
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories like Pizzagate [32] and the
Seth Rich murder conspiracy [15].
We depict important events in TD’s history in Fig. 2. The sub-
reddit was quarantined in mid-June 2019 for violent comments,
and on 26 February 2020, Reddit administrators removed a num-
ber of TD’s moderators, and the community was placed under a
“restricted mode,” which removed the ability of most of its users to
post. Months after the subreddit became inactive, it was banned in
late June 2020. While these moderation measures were taking place,
TD users were actively organizing a “plan B.” In 2017, its members
were already considering migrating to alternative platforms [1],
and in 2019, after getting quarantined, moderators created a backup
site, thedonald.win, that was promoted in the subreddit using
stickied posts [2] (i.e., always shown among the first in the feed
for the community). TD users continued using the subreddit until
the community became “restricted.” Then, they largely flocked to
the alternative website [47]. Note that, although TD was eventually
banned, we focus here on its “restriction,” since it was this measure
that halted user participation and ignited the community migration.
Incel. The r/Incels subreddit was created in August 2013. Short
for involuntary celibates, it was a community built around “The
Black Pill,” the idea that looks play a disproportionate role in finding
a relationship and that menwho do not conform to beauty standards
are doomed to rejection and loneliness [16, 26]. Incels rose to the
mainstream due to their association with mass murderers [20]
and their obsession with plastic surgery [19]. The community has
been linked to a broader set of movements [26, 36] referred to as
the “Manosphere,” which espouses anti-feminist ideals and sees
a “crisis in masculinity.” In this world view, men and not women
are systematically oppressed by modern society. Lately, specialists
have also suggested that these communities may play an important
role in radicalizing disenfranchised men and producing ideological
echo chambers that promote violent rhetoric [20].
The r/Incels subreddit grew swiftly in early 2017, reaching over
3,000 daily posts [36]. Shortly after, in late October 2017, it was
quarantined and then banned two weeks later [44]. In an interview
for a podcast [23], one of the subreddits’ former core members,
seargentincel, mentions that he had already discussed moving the
community outside of Reddit with moderators. According to him,
when the subreddit was banned, he created the standalone website
incels.co, and former r/Incels members quickly organized the
migration in Discord channels. Again we provide exact dates for
relevant events in Fig. 2.
Choice of communities.We study these two communities for two
main reasons. First, due to their importance: they have a large num-
ber of members and have impacted society at large, e.g., w.r.t. con-
spiracy theories [15] and real-world violence [20]. Second, these are
communities whose migrations were backed by community leaders,
and that migrated to other public websites. Had the members of
these communities spread to a loosely connected network of pri-
vate channels (e.g., on Telegram), there would be several additional
technical and ethical research challenges.
2.3 Toxicity and Radicalization Online
Internet platforms experience a myriad of toxic behaviors such as
incivility [7], harassment [6, 21], trolling [9] and cyberbullying [24].
In recent years, researchers have explored the dynamics of such
behaviors online aided by automatic methods [29, 36]. Broadly,
methods employed fall under one of two categories. They either
(a) count hate-related or toxicity-related words (e.g., using Hate-
Base [18]); or (b) deploymachine-learning basedmethods to classify
comments as toxic or as hateful (e.g., Google’s Perspective API [34]).
Methods differ in what they intend to measure: some aim to mea-
sure “hate speech,” while others “toxicity.” While these concepts
differ tremendously, research has suggested that measuring hate
speech through text is difficult due to its contextual nature, and that
machine learning classifiers struggle to distinguish between offen-
sive and hateful speech [12, 37]. Intertwined with online toxicity are
movements and ideologies that engage in harassment campaigns
and real-world violence, as well as espouse hateful views towards
minorities [25, 28]. Social networks have been identified as places
where individuals are exposed and eventually adhere to such fringe
movements [38].
In this direction, the work of Grover and Mark [17], also on
Reddit, is particularly relevant. They derive text-based signals to
identify ideological radicalization in Reddit. Their work suggests
that behaviors indicative of radicalization such as fixation and group
identification may be captured through automated text analysis. We
extend their methodology to assess the changes in user-generated
content following the migrations, using the same word categories
(derived from Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC [33])
and developing, for the Incel and TD communities, custom-built
“fixation dictionaries” that contain terms serving as objects of fix-
ation in the communities (e.g. leftist for TD, feminism for Incels).
Additionally, we use Perspective API to measure how toxicity in
these communities changed post-migration.
The suitability of using models from the Perspective API as tox-
icity sensors has been explored in previous work. Rajadesingan
et al. [35] found that, for Reddit political communities, the per-
formance of the classifier is similar to that of a human annotator,
while Zannettou et al. [48] found that Perspective’s “Severe Toxicity”
model outperforms other alternatives like HateSonar [12]. Perspec-
tive has been shown to be biased against comments mentioning
marginalized subgroups and for comments posted in African Amer-
ican English [42]. Here, we find no compelling reason to believe
that these biases may impact comparisons in the toxicity of the
communities studied before and after the migrations.
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Table 1: Overview of our datasets.
Platform Community Submissions Comments Users
Reddit
/r/Incels 17,403 340,650 18,088
/r/The_Donald 251,090 2,703,615 80,002
Websites
Incels.co 25,138 385,765 2,270
thedonald.win 280,156 2,390,641 38,767
2.4 Relation with Prior Work
Overall, previous research discussed above has examined the ef-
ficacy of community-level moderation within Reddit [8, 41] and
analyzed cross-platform migrations that ensued [31]. Our work
takes a significant step further, by assessing the efficacy of these in-
terventions in a new direction. Given that communities do migrate
following moderation measures, we study if these measures are
effective when considering the development of the communities
outside of their original platform. To do so, we draw from a rich lit-
erature of existing work on online toxicity and its relationship with
behaviors indicative of radicalization [17], as well as on previous
studies analyzing the communities at hand [14, 36].
3 MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1 Data Collection
We collect data from both Reddit (for the period before migrations)
and standalone websites (for the period after).
Reddit. To collect Reddit data, we use Pushshift [5], a service that
performs large-scale Reddit crawls. We collect all submissions and
comments made on r/The_Donald and r/Incels, starting from
120 days before the moderation measure, and until its date. Specif-
ically, for r/Incels, we collect data between 10 July 2017 and 7
November 2017; for r/The_Donald, between 29 October 2019 and
26 February 2020. Overall, we collect around 3 million comments in
260K submissions (or “threads”) from both subreddits (see Table 1).
Standalone websites. We additionally implement and use cus-
tom Web crawlers to collect data from the standalone websites
(incels.co and thedonald.win). For each, we collect all submis-
sions and comments posted for a period of 120 days after the
community-level moderation measure. Specifically, for incels.co,
we collect data between 7 November 2017 and 6 March 2018; for
thedonald.win, between 26 February 2020 and 24 June 2020. Over-
all, we collect over 2.5 million comments and submissions from
thedonald.win and over 400K comments and submissions from
incels.co. In the rest of the paper, to ease presentation, we refer
to both submissions and comments as “posts.”
3.2 User Analysis
Webriefly describe ourmethods formatching users across platforms
and for analyzing newcomers.
Matched Users. To better understand changes at the user-level,
we also carry out analyses with matched users, finding pairs of
users with the exact same username on both Reddit and the stan-
dalone websites. We consider that these users are the same indi-
viduals in the two platforms, an assumption backed by anecdotal
evidence from within the communities (thedonald.win even had
a feature to reserve your Reddit username [3]) and by previous
Table 2: Fixation dictionaries.
Incels female(s) normie(s) chad(s) virgin whore(s) girl(s) rope gf
girlfriend women beta cunt suicide pussy woman bitch(es)
cuck(s) feminism
TD trans commie dem(s) democrat(s) deep communist diversity
leftist communism antifa socialist left socialism libs gender
research [31]. Allowing for upper/lower-case differences, using this
method, we were able to match 8,651 users between r/The_Donald
and thedonald.win (around 20% of the user base of the latter) and
286 users between r/Incels and incels.co (around 13%).
Newcomers.We estimate the inflow of newcomers by analyzing
the time of the first post of each user in the communities. We con-
sider both pre- and post-migration platforms in this process, so, if
a user posted for the first time in r/TheDonald before the migra-
tion, and then again in thedonald.win with the same username,
they would be counted as a newcomer only in the first occasion.
To prevent a spike in newcomers at the beginning of the study
period, we additionally download, for each community, all history
available in Pushshift to act as a buffer. Thus, on the first day of the
study period (e.g., 29 October 2019 for TD), we count as newcomers
only the users that posted for the first time considering the (almost
complete) Pushshift dump.
3.3 Content Analysis
To understand the impact of platform migration on the content
being produced by the communities, we use text-based signals
associated with toxicity and user radicalization [17, 29].
Fixation dictionary.We generate a fixation dictionary for each of
the communities, selecting terms related to their “objects of fixa-
tion.” More specifically, we: (1) select terms that are more likely to
occur in the communities of interest as compared to Reddit in gen-
eral, and (2) manually curate these terms, selecting those that are
related to these communities’ objects of fixation (e.g., women and
feminism for Incels). To obtain the list of terms, we extract words
from the communities of interest and from a 1% random sample of
Reddit for a period of one month (immediately prior to the study
period previously described). We exclude bot-related messages (e.g.,
auto-moderation), stop-words, and words that occurred fewer than
50 times, and calculate the log-ratio between the frequency of a
keyword in the communities being studied and on Reddit in general.
From this, we obtain, for each community, the 250 terms that have
the highest relative occurrence. Then, to build the fixation dictio-
nary, three authors of this paper (all familiar with the communities
at hand) discussed each term and came to an agreement on whether
or not that term was an object of fixation. Table 2 reports the terms
in our fixation dictionary for each community; be advised that the
terminology in this table is offensive.
Toxicity score. To analyze content toxicity, we use Google’s Per-
spective API [34], an API consisting of several machine learning
models, trained on manually annotated corpora of text. More specif-
ically, we employ the “Severe Toxicity” model which allows us to
assess how likely (on a scale between 0 and 1) a post is to be “rude,
disrespectful, or unreasonable and is likely to make you leave a
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Figure 3: Activity levels: Daily activity statistics for the TD community (top) and the Incel community (bottom) 120 days
before and after migrations. Dots represent the daily average for each statistic, and the blue lines depict the model fitted in
the regression discontinuity analysis. Themigration date and a grace period around it (used in themodel) are depicted as solid
and dashed gray lines, respectively. Dots shown in gray represent days where Pushshift ingest had issues, or where there was a
large volume of spam-like content. On top of each subplot, we report the coefficients associated with the moderation measure
in the model (𝛼 and 𝛽). Coefficients for which 𝑝 < 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. For the TD
community, we mark the killing of George Floyd (on 25 May 2020), with a red cross (×) close to the x-axis.
discussion.” This model is also trained specifically to not classify
benign usage of foul language as toxic.
LIWC. We measure changes in word choices using the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) tool [46]. LIWC consists of var-
ious dictionaries (in total 4.5K words) to classify words into over
70 categories, including general characteristics of posts (e.g., word
count), linguistic components (e.g., adverbs), psychological pro-
cesses (e.g., cognitive processes), and non-psychological processes
(e.g., pronouns). In this work, we study changes for the following
(aggregated) LIWC 2015 categories: (1) Negative Emotions: sum
of the Anger, Anxiety, and Sadness LIWC categories; (2) Hostility:
sum of Anger, Swear, and Sexual LIWC categories. (3) Pronouns:
we focus on the usage of third-person plural (e.g., “they”), and first
person plural (e.g., “we”) pronouns.
Mapping signals to warning behaviors. These different signals,
as well as their combinations, have been described as warning
behaviors of ideological radicalization. We focus on two warning
behaviors described by Cohen et al. [11]: (1) Fixation: a pathological
preoccupation with a person or cause that is increasingly expressed
with negative and angry undertones; and (2) Group Identification:
strong identification and moral commitment to the in-group and
distancing from the out-group. To study changes in fixation, we
analyze our fixation dictionaries along with Toxicity scores and the
word categories Negative Emotions and Hostility. To study changes
in group identification, we study changes in the usage of pronouns
as measured by LIWC. These choices were motivated, as discussed
earlier, by previous work by Grover and Mark [17].
3.4 Ethics and Reproducibility
In this work, we only used data publicly posted on the Web and
did not (1) interact with online users in any way, nor (2) simulate
any logged-in activity on Reddit or the other platforms. When
we matched users on Reddit and the fringe platforms, we did not
attempt to gain any information about users’ personal identities.
Also, note that we will release reproducibility data and code along
with the final version of the paper.
4 CHANGES IN ACTIVITY LEVELS
In this section, we measure how the community-level moderation
measures changed posting activity levels and the capacity of the
two communities to attract newcomers (RQ1). We do so from two
different perspectives. First, we aggregate our data on a daily ba-
sis, inspecting community-level changes in the number of posts,
active users and newcomers. Next, we zoom in to the user-level and
examine how individual users’ behavior changed post-migration.
4.1 Community-level Trends
Fig. 3 shows the daily number of newcomers, posts, and active users
in each community before and after the migrations for both the TD
and the Incel community. Note that we consider data from both the
subreddit and the fringe platform users migrated towards.
To gain a better understanding of the overall trends, we per-
form a regression discontinuity analysis for each statistic in each
community. We employ a linear model:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑡, (1)
where 𝑡 is the date, which takes values between −120 and +120 and
equals 0 in the day of the moderation measure; 𝑦𝑡 is statistic we
are modeling; and 𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for days
following the moderation measure (i.e., 𝑡 > 0), and 0 otherwise. Our
model assumes that daily activity levels (for the different metrics)
can be approximated by a line (defined by coefficients 𝛼0 and 𝛽0),
which, post-migration, can change both its intercept (𝛼) and its
slope (𝛽). We analyze these changes to understand the impact of
platform migrations on the communities at hand.
We exclude data from a “grace period” of 15 days before and
after the moderation measure. This accounts for the bursty behavior
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happening to user activity metrics in the days around the migration.
For example, for newcomers, many of the users who migrated
to the new website (thedonald.win or incels.co) choose new
usernames, which creates a spike in the metric. However, this initial
spike is not interesting to capture the overall trend of newcomers
in the website, and the grace period addresses that. Additionally,
there were a few days on which the Pushshift ingest had problems
or where there was a large volume of spam-like content. The values
for the statistics on these dates are depicted as gray dots in Fig. 3
and were not considered to fit the models. Both coefficients and
95% CI for each parameter in the regressions are shown in Table 3.
Newcomers. The first column of Fig. 3 shows the number of daily
newcomers in each community (as described in Sec. 3.2). We find
that, for both communities, there was a significant decrease in the
influx of newcomers following the migrations. The TD community
saw a significant decrease in the offset of around 78 daily newcom-
ers (𝛼 = −77.8). This represents a percent change of around −30% of
theMean Value Before the community-level Intervention (referred
to as MVBI henceforth), i.e., the drop represents roughly 30% of
the average daily value in the pre-migration period. The decrease
was even more substantial for the Incel community, which expe-
rienced around 215 fewer newcomers a day (𝛼 = −215.4), roughly
−150% of the MVBI (note that the drop was therefore bigger than
the pre-migration average). Furthermore, the Incel community had
a significant increasing trend before the migration (𝛽0 = 0.9), which
was weakened in the post-migration period (𝛽 = −0.9).
Posts and users. The second and third columns of Fig. 3 show
that both the total number of daily posts and daily posting users
dropped significantly post-migration. TD experienced a decrease
of around 14.4k daily posts ( 𝛼 = −14416, −55% of the MVBI ) and
of around 4.7k daily active users (𝛼 = −4774, −65% of theMVBI ). In
both cases, the slope became more steep after the migration, with
a significant increase of around 121 new posts a day (𝛽 = 120.6),
and around 14 additional active users a day (𝛽 = 13.7). A possible
explanation for this increase is that the killing of George Floyd (25
May 2020) and the demonstrations that ensued may have boosted
participation on the platform, since the date coincides with a sharp
rise in both statistics. Repeating the regression analysis excluding
the period after 24 May 2020, we find non-significant decreases in
the slope (𝛽) for both statistics, which strengthens this hypothesis.
We further discuss this confounder in Sec. 6.
For the Incel community, there were significant decreases of
around 2.6k posts a day (𝛼 = −2651, −73% of the MVBI ), and of
around 777 daily active users (𝛼 = −777.4, −116% of the MVBI ).
Looking at the trends for the number of active users, we find a
significant positive trend across whole period (𝛽0 = 3.9, see Table 3)
but the slope decreases significantly after the migration (𝛽 = −3).
Posts per user. The fourth column shows the daily average for
the posts per user ratio. Here, we find that the moderation measure
significantly increased relative activity. The TD community showed
an increase in the number of daily posts per user of around 1 extra
posts per user (𝛼 = 1.1, 32% of the MVBI ); for Incels, the increase
was of around 7 extra posts per user (𝛼 = 7.4, 112.71% of the
MVBI ). In both cases there is also a significant increase in the trend
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Figure 4: CCDFs of posts per user: For each community, we
depict the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of the number of posts per user for: (1) all users who
posted in the 120 days before (solid blue) and after themoder-
ationmeasure (solid red), and (2) userswemanaged tomatch
based on username while they were still on Reddit (dashed
blue) and on the fringe platform (dashed red). The plot also
depicts the mean value for each one of these populations as
vertical lines in the same color/style scheme. Recall that the
CCDF maps every value in the 𝑥-axis to the percentage of
values in a sample that are bigger than 𝑥 (in the 𝑦-axis).
the overall scenario: although the activity in the communities is
reduced, relative to the number of users, it increases.
4.2 User-level Trends
The analyses done so far paint a comprehensive picture of the
changes in activity due to the migration at the community-level. Yet,
they do not disentangle the effects happening at the user-level. We
found that relative activity increased (i.e., fewer users posted more
often), but the underlying mechanism for this change is still unclear.
Users’ activity may have indeed increased after the migration, i.e.,
individually, each user who migrated might post more often on the
fringe website, but the increase could also be due to self-selection:
users who migrated following the moderation measure might have
been more active to begin with.
Understanding the reason behind the activity increase is impor-
tant in order to evaluate the efficacy of the moderation measure.
If the increase occurred because users became more active, the
subset of users “ignited” by the moderation measure could cause
even greater harm. However, if this increase were only due to self-
selection, we might consider the measure successful in decreasing
the activity and reach of the communities. To evaluate this, we
perform an additional set of analyses inspecting what changed at
the user level post-migration. To do so, we analyze the set of users
before and after the migration, and additionally, the set of matched
users described in Sec. 3.2.
Comparing posts-per-user distributions.We begin by compar-
ing the distribution of posts from matched users and the general
population of users both before and after the migration. Fig. 4 de-





















Figure 5: User-level change in number of posts: Mean log-
ratios between the number of posts before and after the mi-
gration for each user. In the first column, the mean is calcu-
lated for all users, while for the last four, we stratify users
according to their level of pre-migration activity. The hori-
zontal line depicts the scenario where the number of posts
remained the same (log-ratio = 0). Error bars represent 95%
CIs.
of the number of posts for all users (solid line) and for matched
users (dashed line) both in the fringe communities (in red) and on
Reddit (in blue).
Considering all users, the CCDFs confirm our previous analysis,
showing that users are more active in the fringe websites, since the
red solid line is consistently above the blue solid line. This is also
captured by the mean of user activity in fringe communities which
is of 73.1 posts per user (95% CI: [70, 76.3]) for the TD community,
and of 180.5 (95% CI: [155.5, 209.7]) for Incels. These values are
significantly higher than in Reddit, where there are, on average,
37.3 posts per user (95% CI: [36.2, 38.5]) in the TD community, and
19.8 (95% CI: [18.2, 21.4]) in the Incel community.
Comparing the number of posts by users on Reddit in general
(blue line) with users we managed to match (dashed blue line), we
find that matched users are more active than users in general. In
Reddit, matched users had an average of 127.2 posts (95% CI: [120.2,
134.8]) in the TD community, and 319.1 posts (95% CI: [264.4, 381.2])
in the Incel community, significantly higher than the average user
in Reddit in each community (reported above).
Matched comparisons. The above analysis suggests that users
who migrated were more active than average on Reddit, which
could lead to an increase in relative activity due to self-selection.
To further investigate this, we compare, for each matched user, the
change in number of posts before and after the migration. More
specifically, we analyze the log-ratio of posts before vs. after the





that this metric provides an intuitive interpretation of the change
in activity for a user: if the numbers of posts before and after the
migration are the same, the log-ratio will be 0; if the user posted
twice as much, it will be 1; and if the user posted half as much, −1.
In Fig. 5, we depict the mean value of the log-ratios for all users
in the first column and, in the next four columns, for users stratified
by their activity in the pre-migration period. We divide users in
quartiles according to how much they posted in the pre-migration
period
2
and then report the mean for each quartile.
Considering the complete set of matched users (first column of
Fig. 5), we find that the mean activity log-ratios are significantly
smaller than zero for both communities: -0.80 (95% CI: [-0.86, -
0.74]) for the TD community and -0.54 (95% CI: [-0.97, -0.11]) for
the Incel community, indicating that the matched users did not
increase their activity levels after moving to the new platform. This
result provides further evidence for the self-selection hypothesis:
not only did we find the group of matched users to be more active,
but, within this group, activity has decreased.
Analyzing the users stratified by their activity (in the last four
columns of Fig. 5), we find that this decrease in activity seems to be
stronger for users who were the most active in the pre-migration
period. The mean log-ratios for each quartile in TD are, respectively,
`𝑄1 = 1.1, `𝑄2 = −0.7, `𝑄3 = −1.5, and `𝑄4 = −2.0. This shows that
users in the least active quartile (Q1) became around twice (2
1.1
) as
active, while those in the most active quartile (Q4) decreased their
activity to around one-quarter (2
−2.04
). For the Incel community
we observe a similar pattern, with mean log-ratios of `𝑄1 = 2.0,
`𝑄2 = −0.8, `𝑄3 = −1.3, and `𝑄4 = −2.0. This finding further miti-
gates the concern that a core group of extremely dedicated users
was “ignited” by the migration.
4.3 Take-Aways
Our analysis suggests that community-level moderation measures
significantly hamper activity and growth in the communities we
study. For both communities, there was a substantial decrease in the
number of newcomers, active users, and posts after the moderation
measure. Yet, this tells only part of the story: we also find an increase
in the relative activity for both communities: per user, substantially
more daily posts occurred on the fringe websites.
A closer look into user-level indicates that this relative increase
in activity is due to self-selection, rather than an increase in user
activity post-migration. Not only do we find that users we managed
to match were more active on Reddit before the migration, but
they even reduced their overall activity after they went to the new
platform.
5 CHANGES IN CONTENT
In this section, we use the signals described in Sec. 3.3 to analyze
whether the communities and their users became more toxic and
ideologically radical following the migrations. We again analyze
community- and user-level trends separately.
5.1 Community-level Trends
To study community-level trends, we use a regression discontinuity
design similar to Equation (1); however, here we add an extra term
to control for changes in length that may be associated with the
migration.
3
The model now takes on this form:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑡 , (2)
2
For the TD community, the quartile ranges for the number of posts before the mi-
gration were 𝑄1 = [1, 7) , 𝑄2 = [7, 27) , 𝑄3 = [27, 100) , 𝑄4 = [100,∞) ; for Incels,
𝑄1 = [1, 19) ,𝑄2 = [19, 116) ,𝑄3 = [116, 398) ,𝑄4 = [398,∞) .
3
We find a significant decrease in the average post length for the Incel community
post-migration (131.7 vs. 118.0), and significant increase for TD (129.2 vs. 141.2).
7
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Figure 6: Content signals: Daily content-related statistics for the TD community (top) and the Incel community (bottom) 120
days before and after migrations. For the Fixation Dictionary and the LIWC-related metrics, black dots depict, for each day,
the percentage of words belonging to each word category. For Toxicity, they depict the daily percentage of posts with toxicity
scores higher than 0.80. For Toxicity, Negative Emotions, and Hostility, we limit our analysis to posts that contain at least one
word in our fixation dictionaries. We again show the output of our model as solid blue lines, and the coefficients related to
the moderation measure (𝛼 and 𝛽) on top of each plot (marking those for which 𝑝 < 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 with ***, **, and *,
respectively). For the TD community, we mark the killing of George Floyd, with a red cross (×) close to the x-axis.
where 𝑙𝑡 represents the median length of posts (in characters) on
day 𝑡 . We add this covariate to ensure that changes in the intercept
(𝛼) and the slope (𝛽) following the intervention are not confounded
by changes in the way people post on the new platforms (e.g.,
longer posts). Note that a consequence of this added term is that
when we plot the number of posts (on the 𝑦-axis) per day (on the
𝑥-axis), we no longer get a straight line since changes in the median
length (which varies with time) may impact the outcome of the
regression. Thus, for the plots, we fix the value of the length as the
average value through the entire period in order to isolate the effect
of the intervention and simulate that there is no length change.
For descriptions of the other coefficients, see Equation (1). Again,
all coefficients for the regression analysis, along with confidence
intervals, are shown in Table 3.
Fixation dictionary.We begin by inspecting the prevalence of the
fixation dictionary terms over time, as depicted in the first column
of Fig. 6. For the TD community we observe a significant drop of
𝛼 = −0.2 percentage points in the usage of terms in fixation dictio-
nary (−47% of the MVBI ). For the Incel community, following the
intervention we also see a decrease of around 𝛼 = −0.4 percentage
points in the usage of words in the fixation dictionary (−18% of
the MVBI ). In both cases, we also observe a positive increase in the
trend after the intervention (𝛽 = 0.002 for both communities).
Fixation-related signals.Next, we study changes in Toxicity,Neg-
ative Emotions, and Hostility. We limit this analysis to the set of
posts containing at least one word in the fixation dictionary (see Ta-
ble 2) since we are particularly interested in how the communities
are talking about their objects of fixation. We consider a comment
to be toxic if it has a toxicity score above 80% and calculate, for each
day, the fraction of toxic posts. This threshold has been used as a
default in other papers [48] and production-ready applications that
use the API [30]. For the other LIWC-based metrics, we calculate
the proportion of words in the specific dictionaries used per day.
The second column in Fig. 6 shows the changes in the percentage
of toxic posts for both communities. For the Incel community, we
find no significant change following the interventions. For TD,
there is a significant increase right after the intervention of around
𝛼 = 0.9more toxic posts containing the fixation dictionary (44% of
theMVBI ). However, we see a significant decreasing trend of around
𝛽 = −0.006 fewer toxic posts containing words in the fixation
dictionary per day. This decrease in the overall trend does not
necessarily mean that average percentage of toxic posts will return
to the pre-migration levels. After the sharp increase in toxicity
following the moderation measure, the daily toxicity levels may
settle at a new baseline higher than pre-migration values.
The third and fourth columns in Fig. 6 depict changes in Negative
Emotions and Hostility, respectively. We find that in most cases
these two metrics experience a decrease in the intercept following
the community level interventions, although effects are not always
significant (𝑝 > 0.05).
Pronoun usage. In the fifth and sixth columns of Fig. 6, we report
the usage of two types of personal pronouns: first-person plural
pronouns (e.g., “we,” “us,” “our”) and third-person plural pronouns
(e.g., “they,” “their”). For the Incel community, we see no significant
change in the usage of either type of pronouns following the migra-
tion. For TD, however, there are interesting changes in their usage.
For first person plural pronouns, following the intervention, we
find a significant increase in usage of around 𝛼 = 0.3 percentage
points (31% of the MVBI ), and a significant decrease in the slope,
𝛽 = −0.002. For third-person plural pronouns, we find the oppo-
site. Following the intervention, we find a significant decrease of
𝛼 = −0.3 percentage points (−17% of the MVBI ), followed by a
significant increase in the trend, 𝛽 ′ = 0.005.
First-person plural pronouns capture group identification, and
third-person plural pronouns have been associated with extrem-

























Figure 7: User-level change in content: We depict the mean
user-level log-ratio for each of the content-related signals
studied. A green horizontal line depicts the scenario of no
change (log-ratio = 0). Error bars represent 95% CIs.
seems to have transiently increased group identification immedi-
ately after the ban, and later, attention seems to have shifted to
the out-group. The reduced focus on the out-group following the
community intervention could also be related to the way words
in the fixation dictionary were used after the migration. There too,
we observe a similar pattern: a sharp drop followed by a gradual
increase in usage.
Overall, these findings suggest that the community migrations
heterogeneously impacted the communities at hand. While not
much changed for the Incel community, we find that for TD, there
were significant increases in signals related to both the fixation
warning behavior (Toxicity) and the group behavior warning be-
havior (both first- and third-person plural pronouns). Again, here
a potential confound is the death of George Floyd in 25 May 2020,
which impacted user activity (see Fig. 3) and coincides with in-
creases in some of the metrics studied (e.g., third person plural
pronouns). By repeating the analysis for TD excluding the period
after 24 May 2020, we still find that these changes hold. We again
observe significant increases in the intercept for Toxicity (𝛼 = 1.2)
and We pronouns (𝛼 = 0.4), as well as a significant increase in the
trend in the usage of They pronouns (𝛽 = 0.03).
5.2 User-level Trends
Similar to our content-level analysis, the reason behind the increase
in some of the signals related to online radicalization are important.
Here, again, it could be that the subset of users who migrated to the
fringe platform were more radical to begin with or that the users
became more radical after the migration. Thus, it is important to
analyze changes at the user level. Luckily, the sample of matched
users gives us the opportunity to control for self-selection since we
can measure, e.g., the percentage of toxic posts before vs. after the
migration for the same group of matched users.
Matched comparison. To disentangle self-selection from user-
level increases following themigration, we compare changes in each
of the signals for the set of matched users. We calculate, for each
user, the fraction of toxic posts (Toxicity higher than 0.8), and the
percentage of words used in each of the defined categories (Hostility,
We, etc.) both before and after the migration. Then, similar to Fig. 5,
we compare the log-ratio between the signals associated with each
user before and after the migration. However, here, calculating the
log-ratio may involve dividing by 0, e.g., for a user who posted
no toxic posts before the migration and 2 after. Thus, for each
individual signal, we limit our analysis to users with positive values
for that signal before and after the migration. Therefore, when
comparing the changes in toxic posts, we consider only users with
at least one toxic post before and one toxic post after the migration.
Similarly, for the LIWC-related signals, we consider only users
who used words in the given category at least once before and at
least once after the migration. We report the mean log-ratio across
matched users for each signal in Fig. 7.
For the TD community, we again observe significant increases
for Toxicity (` = 0.41, which represents an increase of around
32% since 2
0.41 ≈ 1.32), We (` = 0.26, 20% increase), and They
(` = 0.12, 9% increase). This suggest that the increases previously
observed were not caused merely by self-selection. For the Incel
community, there were non-significant increases in Toxicity (0.13,
9% increase) and small non-significant decreases in the usage of
both pronoun-related categories. For both communities, we again
significant decreases in the usage of words in the fixation dictionary
(` = 0.15, 11% increase in both cases). We also find significant
increases in signals that we did not observe in the community-
level analysis. Namely, for both communities we find significant
increases in Hostility (8% increase for TD and 9% for Incels), and
for TD, we find a significant increase in Negative Emotions ( 8%
increase).
Regression discontinuity analysis. The previous analysis in-
dicates that there were significant changes in the radicalization-
related signals for the matched sample, some of which we did not
observe in the community-level analysis. To better understand the
matched sample, and the differences between the results at the
community-level and the user-level, we repeat the regression dis-
continuity analysis done for the signals of interest using only posts
from the matched user sample. We use exactly the same model as in
Equation (2), changing only the data: there we used all posts by all
users, herewe use all posts by matched users. The daily mean values
for each of the signals along with the regression lines are shown in
Fig. 8. Note that, for comparison, we use exactly the same axes as
in Fig. 6. We plot the regression lines for the analysis done with all
users in blue, and the regression line for the analysis with matched
users in orange. Coefficients along with confidence intervals are
again presented in Table 3.
For several signals, results in this reduced sample are very similar
to the previous analysis. For example, for TD, we have exactly the
same coefficients for the usage of the fixation dictionary (𝛼 = −0.2,
and 𝛽 = 0.002) and of third-person plural pronouns (𝛼 = −0.3,
and 𝛽 = 0.005). Yet, for some of the signals, we do find significant
differences following the community migrations. More specifically,
for TD community, following the migration, we find significant
increases in the trends for Negative Emotions (𝛽 = 0.002) and
Hostility (𝛽 = 0.003), and we find no significant decrease in the
trend for the Toxicity signal (which used to be the case). Also,
for Incels, we find significant increases in the trend for Negative
Emotions (𝛽 = 0.004) and Hostility (𝛽 = 0.009).
Overall, this analysis confirms the results previously discussed
in Fig. 7 and suggest that users in the matched sample were dispro-
portionally impacted by the community-level intervention. This is
different from what we observed when looking at activity levels.
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Figure 8: Daily content signals formatched users:We repeat the same analysis from Sec. 5.1 considering the sample ofmatched
users. Dots depict the daily content-related statistics for the matched users in each community before and after the interven-
tion. We depict the model fitted in Sec. 5.1, considering all users in blue, and the model fitted only with matched users in
orange. Above each plot, we show the coefficients related to the moderation (𝛼 and 𝛽) for the model considering only matched
users. For additional details, see Fig. 6.
There, when we zoomed in on matched users, we found that they
had decreased their activity (even though the number of posts per
user grew). Here, on the contrary, we find that these users seem to
have become more radical than the general population.
5.3 Take-Aways
Altogether, our analysis shows that, for TD, community-level in-
terventions and the migrations that ensued are associated with
significant increases in radicalization-related signals. A closer look
at the matched user sample indicates that these increases were
not merely due to self-selection, since we also observe significant
user-level increases for all but one of the signals studied. Also, ana-
lyzing the matched sample, we find that the migration may have
disparately impacted these users, since the differences for them are
more substantial.
A second important result of our content-level analysis is that
communities were heterogeneously impacted. When comparing
how the activity in the two communities changed (Sec. 4), we found
the same patterns overall; whereas, when comparing how the con-
tent changed, we found rather distinct behaviors across the two
communities. Unlike the TD community, for Incels, there were
often decreases in signals related to radicalization following the
community migration.
6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Our work paints a nuanced portrait of the benefits and possible
backlashes of community-level interventions. On the one hand, we
found that the interventions were effective in decreasing activity
and the capacity of the community to attract newcomers. Also, we
found evidence that relative increase in activity (i.e., fewer users
posting more) is likely due to self-selection: the users who migrated
to the new community were more active to begin with. On the
other hand, we found significant increases in radicalization-related
signals for one of the communities studied (TD), even when con-
trolling for self-selection. In fact, these increases were even more
substantial for the set of matched users studied. In this section, we
discuss the implications of these results for platforms and future
research, as well as the limitations of our study.
6.1 Limitations and Future Work
Communities. Our work focuses on two communities: TD and
Incels. However, Reddit has sanctioned many other communities
that may have migrated to new fringe websites. The implications
of such sanctions for migration may differ based on the specifics of
each community. That said, the communities we study are among
the most prominently sanctioned subreddits, and our analysis pro-
vides early insights into the consequences of such sanctions. In the
future, similar analysis on other sanctioned communities would
help disentangle how contextual factors including community size,
topic, and design of new websites affect migration patterns.
Migrations and dispersion.We consider the effects of migration
to only one fringe website per each of the sanctioned communities
we study. In both cases, the migration to the websites we ana-
lyze were officially endorsed by the subreddits’ moderators, and,
for r/The_Donald, the subreddit promoted migration to the new
site while it could. However, users may have migrated to other
platforms as well. For example, on Reddit, after r/Incels was
banned, an old subreddit called r/Braincels reportedly became
popular (until eventually being banned too). Also more broadly,
some community-level interventions may not result in “successful”
coordinated migration. Studying what happens in these cases is an
interesting (although methodologically challenging) direction for
future research.
Confounders. The responsiveness of these communities to real-
world events creates confounders. This is particularly true for the
TD community, where we found significant changes in the content-
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and activity-related signals in reaction the political event which
was the killing of George Floyd. While our quasi-experimental
research design controls for linear trends, sudden bursts in content-
related signals can partially impact our results. Controlling for these
trends is hard since the reaction of these communities to real world
changes is inherently linked to the harms they pose to society.
However, in our specific case, we find that the effects observed
held even when limiting the period of the regression discontinuity
analysis to before the event (i.e., George Floyd’s killing).
Mapping signals to externalities. Our analysis relies on user
activity and signals derived from user-generated content to an-
alyze online toxic communities. Our main result suggests that
community-level interventions may involve a trade-off: less activity
at the expense of a possibly more radical community elsewhere.
Yet, the relationship between these activity- and content-related
signals from toxic online communities and their real-world harms
is still fuzzy. If one were to mitigate the harm caused by these users,
it is unclear, for instance, whether a reduction of 50% in posting
activity where each user is 10% more “toxic” is a worthwhile trade-
off. While such a fine-grained assessment of the consequences of
a moderation intervention is out of scope of this paper, further
study of causal links between toxicity, user activity, and real-world
harm is an important research direction to improve the quality of
moderation decisions.
6.2 Implications for Online Platforms
Our analysis of migration dynamics highlights that community-
wide moderation interventions do not happen in a vacuum. When
platforms sanction an entire community, as opposed to taking user-
level actions, communities may migrate en gros to a different plat-
form. Platforms have difficult decisions to make: they need to con-
sider the effects of community-wide sanctions not only on their
own platforms, but the consequences to other online and offline
spaces as well.
Our results provide empirical cues that can help platforms make
such decisions. The methodological framework we use in this paper
may also be used for other contexts and platforms to evaluate the
effectiveness of moderation interventions. Additionally, platforms
have at their disposal abundant data that can further clarify the
trade-offs we have presented. We hope that future extensions of
this work will yield more precise guidelines on how to handle
problematic online communities.
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Table 3: Coefficients for all regressions discontinuity analyses done throughout the paper, including 95% confidence intervals.
Coefficients for which 𝑝 < 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The value [10−3] in the beginning of
a cell indicates that the value of the cell as well as the confidence intervals presented should be multiplied by 10−3. This may
cause slight differences in the numbers in this table and the ones presented in the plots, since here we present the results at
higher precision. Note that this table contains the regression results for three different analysis carried out throughout the
paper, and depicted in Fig. 3, Fig. 6, and Fig. 8. For presentation reasons we omit the confidence intervals for the intercept
across the whole period (𝛼0), which is significant (𝑝 < 0.001) across all of the models.
Venue Statistic 𝛼0 𝛽0 𝛼 𝛽 𝛾 𝑅
2
Community-level activity (Fig. 3)
TD #newcomers 214.7∗∗∗ −0.5 (−1.3, 0.2) −77.8∗∗ (−127.9,−27.7) 0.5 (−0.5, 1.4) - 0.24
#posts 26650
∗∗∗
8.8 (−17.9, 35.5) −14416∗∗∗ (−16947,−11886) 120.6∗∗∗ (83.9, 157.2) - 0.41
#users 7593
∗∗∗
4 (−0.5, 8.5) −4774∗∗∗ (−5184,−4365) 13.7∗∗∗ (8.1, 19.3) - 0.85
#posts/#users 3.5∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 0.8 (−2.7, 1) 1.1∗∗∗ (0.9, 1.3) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.006, 0.01) - 0.85
Incels #newcomers 224.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ (0.5, 1.4) −215.4∗∗∗ (−250.3,−180.5) −0.9∗∗∗ (−1.3,−0.4) - 0.84
#posts 4840
∗∗∗
19.5∗∗∗ (14.1, 25) −2651∗∗∗ (−3098,−2203) 1.7 (−4.8, 8.2) - 0.55
#users 960.1∗∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗ (2.9, 4.9) −777.4∗∗∗ (−850.2,−704.6) −3∗∗∗ (−4,−2.1) - 0.93
#posts/#users 5
∗∗∗ [10−3 ] − 0.04 (−3, 3) 7.4∗∗∗ (6.6, 8.3) 0.04∗∗∗ (0.02, 0.05) - 0.92
Community-level content (Fig. 6)
TD Fix. Dict 0.6∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.2 (−0.2, 0.5) −0.2∗∗∗ (−0.3,−0.2) [10−3 ] 1.7∗∗∗ (1.2, 2.2) [10−3 ] − 2.2∗ (−4,−0.4) 0.53
Toxicity 3.1∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.5 (−2, 3.1) 0.9∗∗∗ (0.6, 1.3) [10−3 ] − 5.9∗∗ (−10.1,−1.7) [10−3 ] − 6.6∗ (−12.8,−0.4) 0.3
Neg. Emotion 2.7∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
2.2∗∗∗ (1.1, 3.3) −0.2∗∗ (−0.3,−0.06) [10−3 ] − 0.5 (−2.1, 1.1) [10−3 ] − 2 (−4.9, 1) 0.14
Hostility 3.3∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
1.2 (−0.04, 2.4) −0.05 (−0.2, 0.09) [10−3 ] − 0.1 (−2, 1.8) [10−3 ] − 3.5∗ (−6.7,−0.4) 0.08
We 0.6∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 0.7∗∗ (−1.2,−0.2) 0.3∗∗∗ (0.2, 0.3) [10−3 ] − 2.1∗∗∗ (−2.7,−1.4) [10−3 ] 4.3∗∗ (1.7, 6.8) 0.46
They 1.3∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.05 (−0.5, 0.6) −0.3∗∗∗ (−0.4,−0.2) [10−3 ] 4.8∗∗∗ (3.8, 5.7) [10−3 ] 5.5∗∗∗ (2.3, 8.8) 0.55
Incels Fix. Dict 1.9∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 1.8∗ (−3.3,−0.4) −0.4∗∗∗ (−0.5,−0.2) [10−3 ] 2.4∗∗ (0.9, 3.8) [10−3 ] 0.3 (−4.1, 4.6) 0.69
Toxicity 11.4∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
6.9 (−3.1, 16.8) −0.3 (−1.2, 0.6) [10−3 ] − 1.9 (−13.7, 9.9) −0.02 (−0.03, 0.002) 0.13
Neg. Emotion 3.2∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
1 (−0.7, 2.7) −0.1 (−0.3, 0.03) [10−3 ] 1.3 (−0.4, 3.1) [10−3 ] − 1.9 (−4.9, 1.2) 0.25
Hostility 6.3∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.4 (−3.1, 4) 0.05 (−0.3, 0.4) [10−3 ] 2.6 (−0.8, 6.1) [10−3 ] − 9.3∗∗ (−15.8,−2.9) 0.38
We 0.6∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 1 (−2.5, 0.4) 0.06 (−0.05, 0.2) [10−3 ] − 0.4 (−1.3, 0.5) [10−3 ] − 1.9 (−5.7, 2) 0.3
They 1.2∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 0.3 (−2.6, 2.1) −0.1 (−0.3, 0.04) [10−3 ] − 0.2 (−1.6, 1.2) [10−3 ] 2.7 (−3.8, 9.2) 0.44
Matched users content (Fig. 8)
TD Fix. Dict 0.6∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.2 (−0.2, 0.5) −0.2∗∗∗ (−0.3,−0.2) [10−3 ] 1.6∗∗∗ (1.1, 2.1) [10−3 ] − 2.4∗∗ (−4.2,−0.7) 0.54
Toxicity 3.3∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.6 (−2.8, 4) 0.7∗∗ (0.2, 1.1) [10−3 ] − 2.1 (−8.6, 4.5) [10−3 ] − 7.8∗ (−14.6,−0.9) 0.13
Neg. Emotion 2.5∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.5 (−0.5, 1.6) −0.1 (−0.2, 0.006) [10−3 ] 1.7∗ (0.07, 3.3) [10−3 ] − 1.5 (−3.3, 0.3) 0.08
Hostility 3.1∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.09 (−1.4, 1.6) −0.1 (−0.3, 0.03) [10−3 ] 2.6∗ (0.08, 5.1) [10−3 ] − 2.9∗ (−5.4,−0.5) 0.06
We 0.5∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 0.6 (−1.1, 0.008) 0.2∗∗∗ (0.2, 0.3) [10−3 ] − 2.2∗∗∗ (−2.9,−1.4) [10−3 ] 5.2∗∗ (1.4, 9) 0.37
They 1.6∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.1 (−0.6, 0.8) −0.3∗∗∗ (−0.4,−0.2) [10−3 ] 4.5∗∗∗ (3.5, 5.6) [10−3 ] 2.5 (−1.1, 6) 0.44
Incels Fix. Dict 1.9∗∗∗ [10
−3 ] − 2.2∗ (−4,−0.5) −0.4∗∗∗ (−0.5,−0.2) [10−3 ] 1.2 (−1, 3.5) [10−3 ] 1.4 (−2.4, 5.2) 0.68
Toxicity 10.9∗∗∗ 0.01 (−0.008, 0.03) −1.5∗ (−3.1,−0.01) [10−3 ] 9.8 (−12.2, 31.7) [10−3 ] − 1 (−25.1, 23.1) 0.06
Neg. Emotion 3
∗∗∗ [10−3 ]
0.3 (−3, 3.6) −0.3∗ (−0.5,−0.04) [10−3 ] 4.3∗ (0.7, 7.9) [10−3 ] 1.2 (−1.7, 4.1) 0.1
Hostility 6
∗∗∗ [10−3 ]
0.7 (−3.9, 5.3) −0.5∗ (−0.9,−0.05) [10−3 ] 9.1∗∗ (3.6, 14.7) [10−3 ] − 2.9 (−8.4, 2.6) 0.18
We 0.4∗∗∗ [10
−3 ]
0.6 (−0.6, 1.8) −0.2∗∗∗ (−0.3,−0.1) [10−3 ] − 0.3 (−1.6, 0.9) [10−3 ] 4.3∗∗∗ (2.1, 6.5) 0.43
They 1
∗∗∗ [10−3 ] − 0.06 (−1.8, 1.7) −0.2∗ (−0.3,−0.03) [10−3 ] 0.8 (−1.2, 2.8) [10−3 ] 5.9∗∗∗ (2.5, 9.4) 0.25
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